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expect this to be a paper soon, or a part thereof?
SEARLE: 1. Programs are entirely syntactical. 2. Minds have semantics. 3. Syntax is not the same as, nor by itself sufficient for, semantics. Therefore, programs are not minds. QED. [from The Mystery of Consciousness, pg 11, paraphrase of his well-known "Chinese Room Argument"]
RUDNICK: In principle, given a powerful enough computer and a sufficient model of physics, I could simulate with arbitrary precision all of the happenings in a section of space -- assuming that this space does not contain the computer running the simulation. Now I choose to simulate a room containing a human, sitting in a chair. The simulated human in the simulated chair will, for all useful definitions of "conscious", be conscious (although will not necessarily realize that he's part of a simulation). The brain-in-a-vat problem needs neither a brain nor a vat, just a mathematical model of a brain. If you want to say that the program is not a mind but contains one, that's analogous to saying that the physical world is not a mind but contains one. The main point is that if we believe the physical world to be mathematically modelable, we can bring about awake minds within a computer.
Furthermore, "semantics" is an inherently shady word, loaded with connotations of some "objectively extant physical world" that one can reference. You Professor Searle, know just as well as I that you can't get outside of your own head -- eyes don't guarantee that you're seeing anything more real than what a robot with a video camera or an agent with a get_world_input() function gets.
RUDNICK: In principle, given a powerful enough computer and a sufficient model of physics, I could simulate with arbitrary precision all of the happenings in a section of space -- assuming that this space does not contain the computer running the simulation. Now I choose to simulate a room containing a human, sitting in a chair. The simulated human in the simulated chair will, for all useful definitions of "conscious", be conscious (although will not necessarily realize that he's part of a simulation). The brain-in-a-vat problem needs neither a brain nor a vat, just a mathematical model of a brain. If you want to say that the program is not a mind but contains one, that's analogous to saying that the physical world is not a mind but contains one. The main point is that if we believe the physical world to be mathematically modelable, we can bring about awake minds within a computer.
Furthermore, "semantics" is an inherently shady word, loaded with connotations of some "objectively extant physical world" that one can reference. You Professor Searle, know just as well as I that you can't get outside of your own head -- eyes don't guarantee that you're seeing anything more real than what a robot with a video camera or an agent with a get_world_input() function gets.
no subject
Yeah you should totally come and sit in on my class, that'd be awesome :)